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'Over the past thirty years, Africa has suffered from deindustrialization. The 
;quarter century from the early 1980s was a period of declining per capita 
·.jncome and increasing poverty. Structural adjustment policies advocated 
':-.)))' the IMF and the World Bank were predicated on the belief that by 
·~)lminating "distortions" in the economy, Africa would grow faster - by con-
cting an economy based on principles of free and unfettered markets, 
the government restrained to ensuring macro-stability (which typically 
meant price stability), economic performance would be increased and 
ould benefit. 
was recognized, of course, that eliminating trade protection would 
It in the loss of jobs, some in agriculture, many others in industry. The 
ngly held belief, however, was that these workers would quickly find 
in new industries, consistent with the country's comparative advan-
¢.- Moving resources from inefficient protected sectors to more efficient 
petitive sectors would raise incomes. Little attention was paid to the 
'bution of income, perhaps because of an implicit belief In trickledown 
omics - somehow, if the economic pie grew, all would benefit. 
s didn't tum out as the advocates of these policies had hoped. Rather 
growth there was decline. Job creation didn't always keep pace with job 
ction, and so workers moved from low-productivity protected sectors 
n lower-productivity unemployment, open or disguised. When there 
· growth, the benefits often went disproportionately to those at the top, 
.didn't trickle down to the rest of the economy. 
hen, growth resumed, in the first decade of the 21st century it was 
ybased on the boom in commodity prices. The share of global manu-
ngvalue added in Africa in 2008 was 1.1 percent in 2008, down from 
~cent In 2000 (UNCTAD, 2011). Even countries that achieved mac-
nomic stability and evidenced reasonably good governance seemed 
fe to attract much investment outside of the extractive sector. 
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It is imperative that this course of events be changed, particularly since. 
the extractive sector typically does not give rise to many jobs, and certainly 
not enough jobs for the burgeoning labor force in many of the countries. 
(The African labor force is expected to grow - working-age Africans toda 
comprise some 500m people; by 2040, that number will be 1.1 billion.2) 
A propitious time for Africa 
Fortunately, there are a set of events that may be propitious for the subconti· 
nent. First1 increasing wages and an appreciation of exchange rate in East Asi 
may enhance Africa's comparative advantage in manufacturing. The high 
levels of productivity growth in manufacturing - exceeding the increases in 
demand - imply that global employment in manufacturing will be declining; 
but it may be possible for Africa to seize a larger share of these jobs. 
Moreover, there are some spillovers from even imperfectly managed 
natural resources: higher incomes give rise to a demand for more consump· 
lion, and some of this will be locally produced and/or serviced. There is an 
increasingly large middle class. Indeed, by some estimates, only around a 
quarter to a third of the sub-continent's recent growth is directly attribut· 
able to natural resources.3 
Moreover, with the weaknesses in Europe and the United States that 
began with the Great Recession of 2008 looking likely to extend for at least 
a decade, those with funds are looking elsewhere for places in which to 
invest their money. Africa is looking more attractive, with its share of global 
foreign direct investment projects increasing to 5.5 percent in 2011.4 
But many African countries still face serious disadvantages. Deficiencies 
in infrastructure increase both the cost of production and also the costs of 
bringing goods to market and of obtaining necessary inputs. There are also 
important shortages of skilled personnel1 even in an environment in which 
unskilled workers are in abundance. 
This paper is predicated on the belief that these disadvantages can be 
overcome by appropriate government policies, but such policies neces-
sitate moving further away from the structural adjustment/Washington 
Consensus (WC) policies, by embracing industrial policies - policies that 
were shunned under the WC programs. Industrial policies are what we call 
those policies that help shape the sectoral composition of an economy. The 
term is used more broadly than just those policies that encourage the indus-
trial sector. Thus a policy that encourages agro-business, or even agriculture1 
is referred to as an industrial policy. 
Such government policies can enhance the ability of African economies to 
seize an even larger share of global foreign direct investment1 to create new 
domestic enterprises1 and to expand existing enterprises. While many coun-, 
tries within Africa are benefitting from natural resources1 most countries 
have not taken full advantage of those resources, to create new industries 
and to provide employment for more of their citizens. 
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ustrial policies and market failures 
· the International Economic Association/World Bank meeting on indus-
policy in Washington, in May1 2012, 5 there was a broad consensus on 
countries should have such policies: to correct market failures, situ-
ns where markets by themselves do not lead to efficient, or desirable, 
rce allocations; and in some cases1 even to correct other government 
ltres1 where other, harder to alter, government policies "distort" resource 
0cations. 
arket failures arise whenever private rewards and social returns differ1 
d since the work of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) it has been recognized 
~!such discrepancies are pervasive. Industrial policies are designed to car-
. major sectoral or other misallocations. 
Africa, there are at least three objectives of such policies. With many 
tries facing high unemployment1 there is an imperative to create more 
, The labor market is not working the way it does in neoclassical models, 
e there is full employment. That means that the market price of labor 
ost surely markedly higher than the "shadow price," the opportunity 
of labor. Government should encourage labor-intensive sectors and 
ologies. To the extent possible, government should be sensitive to the 
s of labor that are being demanded, using both industrial and educa-
al policies to bring the demand and supply of, say, school-leavers and 
ersity graduates into better alignment. 
ndly1 many African countries have been marked by large increases 
quality.' Industrial policies can affect the extent of inequality, by 
sing the demand for lower-skilled workers, driving up their wages and 
Ing their level of unemployment. While policies focusing on dist:ribu-
have traditionally been centered on tax and transfers, it has long been 
gnized that it may be better (more efficient) to have policies that change 
-, before-tax- and -transfer distribution of income. Such policies reduce 
burden imposed by distortionary redistributive policies (Stiglitz, 1998a). 
hirdly, it has increasingly been recognized that development requires the 
.ctural transformation of the economy (see Lin, 2012; Stiglitz, 1998c). 
kets themselves are not very good at such structural transformations1 
y because the sectors that are being displaced - resources that have to 
from one sector to another - typically suffer large wealth and income 
, and are thus not well placed to make the investments required for 
. ployment. And well-understood capital market imperfections (based on 
mation asymmetries) limit access to outside resources.7 
. purthly, it has long been recognized that what separates developed 
developing countries is not just a gap in resources, but rather a gap in 
,wledge (Stiglitz, 1998b). More broadly, even in developed countries a 
-, e fraction of the increase in per capita income over the last two centuries 
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is attributable to technological progress, to learning how to produce thing 
more efficiently (see Solow, 1957). And the fact that some countries and 
firms have "learned how to learn" helps explain why the last two centurie 
have seen such remarkable increases in standards of living, in compariso 
to the millennia that preceded it, which were marked by stagnation (se 
Maddison, 2001). 
lf this is so, then it means that development strategies should be centere 
on promoting learning, and closing the knowledge gap between developin 
countries and less developed countries. 
Market failures, learning, and industrial policies8 
We suggested earlier that industrial policies are motivated (in part) by a 
attempt to correct market failures, by the failure of markets by themselves 
to yield socially desirable outcomes. There can be too much inequality, too 
high unemployment, too little growth. This paper centers around the failure 
of markets in learning. 
Knowledge is different from ordinary products. Knowledge is essentially 
a public good, that is, its consumption is non-rivalrous (Stiglitz, 1987a, 
1999). When one individual shares knowledge with someone else, it do 
not diminish the amount of knowledge that the first person has. Marke 
by themselves are never efficient in the production and utilization of pub!' 
goods. The producer of the knowledge may restrict the usage of the know! 
edge (through secrecy or patents), in an attempt to appropriate returns, in 
which case there is underutilization. More generally, there wili be underpro 
duction, because - even with effectively enforced patents - there are impor 
tant spillovers from learning. What one firm or industry learns enhanc 
the productivity of others. When learning is a by-product of investment o 
of production, a corollary is that there will be underinvestment or unde 
production (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz, 2012a). 
There are other market failures associated with learning: because learn-
ing is a fixed, sunk cost, sectors in which learning is important are likely 
to be imperfectly competitive.9 Because investments in learning cannot be 
collateralized, imperfections of capital markets may restrain research expen-
ditures, say, relative to real estate speculation. With learning-by-doing, 
optimal production may entail firms increasing production today, beyon 
the point where they are breaking even, in return for the benefit of low 
production costs in the future, but with capital market imperfections, fir 
cannot finance the ensuing losses (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988a). The fac 
that investments in learning are highly risky, and risk markets are absen 
(especially in developing countries), also discourages such investments.10 
The general theory of learning and industrial policies is taken up in 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014a, 2014b ). Here, we focus on several topics 
that illustrate the general themes di'scussed there and that are of particula 
relevance to Africa. 
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The inevitability of industrial policy 
First, however, we want to reiterate an i:cnportant point raised in our earlier 
paper: governments are inevitably involved in industrial policy, in shap-
ing the economy, both by what they do and by what they do not do. If 
they don't manage well the macro-economy, then more cyclically sensitive 
industries will be discouraged. If they use interest rate adjustments to stabi-
'lize the economy, interest sensitive sectors will suffer. If they don't stabilize 
· · .the exchange rate, then non-traded sectors are encouraged. 
Some are wont to say, just let market forces shape the economy, but mar-
ket forces don't exist in a vacuum. Every market is shaped by laws, rules, and 
iegulations. A bankruptcy law that gives priority to derivatives encourages 
··'these fhlancial products. A bankruptcy law that says that student loans can't 
' be discharged, even in bankrnptcy, encourages banks to make more student 
'Joans. A tax law that provides for deductibility of mortgage interest leads to 
.more mortgages. A tax law that taxes capital gains at lower rates than ordi-
:t\ary hlcome encourages land and financial market speculation. 
/'<--- Moreover, in almost all countries, governments play a central role in edu-
'dition, health, infrastructure, and technology, and policies and expenditures 
ili each of these areas - and the balance of spending among these areas - also 
~hapes the economy. In short, all governments really do have an industrial 
policy. The only difference is between those who construct their industrial 
policy consciously, and those who let it be shaped by others, typically by spe-
cial interests, who vie with each other for hidden and open subsidies, and for 
Jes and regulations that favor them, usually at the expense of others. Even 
.e agenda of financial market liberalization was an industrial policy - one 
ed by the banks and the financial sector, the effect of which in many 
1J.11tries was to lead to a bloated financial sector, rife with explicit and 
plidt subsidies (reaching record levels in the crisis of 2008-09), diverting 
urces from other uses that arguably would have led to high sustained 
wth. ltwas an industrial policy that led to more macroeconomic instabil-
, 1 which, as we explain below, was itself adverse to learning. 
.1 The Washington Consensus and learning 
e Washington Consensus policies referred to earlier in this paper focused 
::static efficiency. They didn't even consider the consequences for innova-
and learning. If there was learning and technological progress, it was 
med to be exogenous, outside the purview of policy, and certainly out-
the purview of the economic policies on which they focused. That this 
so was striking, given the observation, made earlier, that development 
so much about learning and economic transformation. 
landard theory has long recognized that there could be a trade-off 
een learning, or dynamic efficiency, and static efficiency. The patent 
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system creates a temporary monopoly and imposes restrictions on the usage 
of knowledge, but these significant static inefficiencies are justified on the 
basis of the increased innovation that results. 
The success of the most successful countries in development - those iri 
East Asia - is largely attributable to their recognition of the importance of 
learning. Korea, for instance1 paid little attention to its static comparative 
advantage. its static comparative advantage would have led that country to 
focus on rice farming. But it knew that even if it became the most produc· 
live rice-farming country in the world, its prospects would be limited. lt 
could prosper only by focusing on sectors from which it could learn, and 
on the basis of which it could close the knowledge gap with more advanced . 
countries. lt developed complementary education and technology policies, 
and it succeeded, increasing its per capita income more than eight-fold in a 
span of less than four decades. 
Had it foilowed the dictates of the Washington Consensus poiicies11 it 
would have eschewed industrial policies, and it would have focused invest· 
ments in education at the primary level - and it would have, at best, been 
a middle-income rice-growing country. Unfortunately, many countries in 
Africa have followed the dictates of the Washington Consensus policies, 
and through the strnctural adjustment programs they bave taken a step 
backwards, as we have noted, becoming increasingly resource-dependent 
economies. 
The Washington Consensus policies were predicated on the assumption 
that markets, by themselves, are efficient; and that therefore the major 
source of inefficiency or malperformance of the economy arises from gov-
ernment intervention. Hence, the first item in the reform agenda is to elimi-
nate these interventions with the market. The only role of the government 
was to ensure price stability. 
Even before these doctrines became fashionable, their intellectual 
underpinnings had been taken away. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) showed, 
for instance, that whenever information was imperfect (asymmetric) and risk 
markets incomplete (which is always the case, and especially so in developing 
countlies) markets are not constrained Pareto-efficient (that is, taking into 
account the costs of obtaining and disseminating information or creating 
and maintaining markets). 
But the financial crisis of 2008 reinforced the conclusion that markets, on 
their own, may be massively inefficient, and unstable. It showed also that 
maintaining price stability did not necessarily lead either to growth, stability, 
or efficiency.12 
in short, the crisis has re-emphasized the importance of market fail-
ures. It is thus natural that there should not only be a rethinking of 
macroeconomic theory and policy, but also of microeconomic theory 
and policy, including the most important subject for Africa today, that of 
industriai policy, of how governments can heip change the structure of 
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the economy to promote learning - thereby increasing long-term sustain-
able growth. 
1.1.1.1 Leaming and 11one-size-fits-all 11 policies 
.. One critique of the Washington Consensus is that it has attempted to 
>hnpose "one-size-fits all" policies. Such policies may be particularly inap-
propriate when it comes to creating a learning society. 
A critical aspect of "learning" is that it takes place locally and must adapt 
to local differences in culture and economic practice. Thus "learning" pre-
scriptions that apply in some environments will not apply in others. For 
example, in some economies what has been called (by outsiders) "crony 
·•capitalism" has a long and successful record. In others it does not. 13 Learning 
J:i.ow to relate to government has value in most economies1 but1 in some, the 
''skills required may concern those related to bidding processes, in others to 
luterpersonal connections. American firms have had to learn to adapt to the 
~oreign Corrupt Practices Act.14 Labor norms differ too among countries, 
'and personnel policies have to accommodate such differences. Differences in 
~bnsumer preferences and norms as well as in distributional channels neces-
,sitate different "learning" about marketing. Most importantly, and perhaps 
obviously, relative factor prices may differ, so that the returns to learning on 
·how to save on the utilization of one factor versus another may differ. 
••These cross-country differences have numerous implications. They help 
IWJ!ain why learning in a firm may spill over more easily to other firms 
the same country than to firms in other countries. The learning in one 
uutry may simply be less relevant to production in the other country . 
They help explain too why it is that in some economies public enterprises 
nction well. In others they do not.15 
They also help explain the limitations of globalization: local firms have 
competitive advantage in having more knowledge about local circum-
ces.16 Much financial information is chiefly available locally, and even 
information is available, outsiders may have less of an understanding 
e nuances of the country's distinctive institutional structure - as foreign 
stors have learned to their cost about US mortgages. Thus, effective capi-
deployment will often require local financial institutions. 
:Unfortunately, Washington Consensus policies which pushed capital and 
'.ancial market liberalization did not take into account this local know!-
. Foreign banks succeeded in attracting depositors away from local 
1 because they were perceived as safer (and1 in some cases, may have 
n, because they had the implicit guarantee of governments with deeper 
kets). But foreign banks were at an information disadvantage relative 
cal banks about small and medium-sized local firms, and it was thus 
al that lending be diverted away toward loans to government, con-
rs, and large domestic firms (including local monopolies and oligopo-
.. But in doing so, local learning and entrepreneurship may have been 
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undermined, and growth weakened. Rashid's paper in this volume (2014 
provides data strongly supporting this conclusion.17 
By the same token, WTO restrictions on industrial policies and domestic 
sourcing (and possibly other restrictions on financial markets) may imped 
the ability of developing countries to foster learning, and to garner fo 
themselves the full learning benefits of foreign direct investment1 or, as w 
shall see shortly, it may force them to employ second-best methods for pro 
mating learning within their economies. 
1.1.2 Macro-conditions for creating a learning society 
Most of this paper is concerned with microeconomic policies, but in our 
earlier paper (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2014), we argued that one of the 
objectives of industrial policies is to create an economic environment that· 
conducive to learning. For this1 the macroeconomic environment is central. 
Economic stability appears to play an important role in creating a success 
ful 11learning11 environment. Evidence for this comes from the experienc 
of developed economies during recessions. Productivity growth is normall 
low during contractions and there is no offsetting gain during subsequen 
expansions.1' The productivity loss during the dislocation associated wi 
the recession appears to be permanent.19 
There are several reasons why stability is important for learning. The firs 
is that much information is embodied within existing institutions, in com 
plex webs of interactions. Key institutions - firms - often die in the face o 
high levels of instability. 
Moreover, managerial attention is limited. When firms are focusing on 
survival1 they have less attention to devote to 11 learning/1 except learnin 
how to survive. 
Thirdly, high levels of macro-instability lead firms to act in a more risk 
averse manner. When films go into recessions, among the first things 
be cut are investmen\s in R&D, and this is even true among firms that ar 
relatively dependent on innovation. Part of the reason is that learning · 
future-oriented. One has to make saclifices today and undertake risks toda 
for future benefits. But in the presence of instability, there is a risk that ther 
will be no future - and hence less reason to make the requisite investmen 
today. Instability weakens future oriented incentives. 
And fourthly, learning requires resources, including access to capital. 
Instability may make capital less accessible and more costly.20 In down-
turns, capital is likely to be rationed, and investments in R&D are often 
sacrificed. 21 
This has important implications for policy: policies that expose countri 
to a high level of instability, or that increase the economy's instability (fo 
example, by weakening automatic stabilizers) have an adverse effect on. 
learning. Examples include financial and capital market liberalization and 
atlon (Rashid, 2012. 
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deregulation (Rashid, 2012; Stiglitz et al., 2006; Stiglitz, 2008), and tarrifica-
tlon (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1977). 
By the same token, policies that focus on price stability, at the expense 
of real stability, may actually be counterproductive (see Stiglitz et al., 2006). 
'lnfiation targeting, with its focus on price stability attained by interest rate 
.adjustments, may be "doubly" bad: Responding to inflation by increasing 
'Interest rates - even when the cause of the infiation is an exogenous supply 
hock - is an example of a pro-cyclical policy. And the increases in interest 
es have a disproportionate effect on certain sectors, those that are most 
erest sensitive and which rely most on bank financing. Small businesses, 
particular, bear the burden. Small firms that may be killed when interest 
s are raised dramatically don't come back to life when they are subse-
ntly lowered: there are important hysteresis effects. This is especially 
ortant in developing countries where there may be a dearth of entrepre-
ship. If, as some claim, much of the learning and innovation in society 
s within small and young enterprises, then these policies increase the 
-m on these key 11leaming11 sectors. But whether that is the case or not
1 
policies exacerbate the already adverse effects arising from the cyclical 
lility in the "shadow" cost of capital. 
Exchange rate policy 
change rate affects the competitiveness of the economy - the abil-
orters to export and of import-competing firms to compete with 
s, The consequences of an appreciation of the currency (say as a result 
flow of capital or foreign aid) can be severe: if the exchange rate 
by say 25 percent, there is no way that (in the short run) produc-
compensate, or for there to be offsetting adjustments of wages and 
es-of other inputs. Moreover, there are, as we have noted, important 
ls effects: a firm that dies because it can't compete is not brought 
life when the exchange rate subsequently falls. (Capital market 
'ons imply that small and medium-sized firms will be especially 
obtain the capital required to tide them over.) 
same token, it is expensive for firms (especially small and medium-
estic firms) to manage exchange rate volatility, especially in 
markets and in the least developed countries. In many of these 
,.there may be no markets in which firms can hedge their exchange 
e it or not, exchange rate policy affects the industrial structure. 
not to actively manage the exchange rate will result in a more 
ange rate and a smaller traded goods sector than would oth-
e case. ln the context of Africa1 the decision of many resource 
es to allow their exchange rate to appreciate has contributed to 
ization, and even the weakening of the agriculture sector . 
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There are several implications of this analysis. First, governments need to 
adopt policies that make exchange rates less volatile, for example, capital . 
controls (or more generally, they have to adopt a portfolio of tools for capi· 
ta! account management).22 
Secondly, governments need to keep exchange rates 11iow11 so as to 
make domestic firms more competitive - to expand exports and import· 
competing sectors, which may also necessitate the build-up of reserves. 
This is especially true because low exchange rates help export sectors like 
manufacturing, which have higher learning elasticities and generate more 
learning externalities (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2006; 2014b). 
But a concern about industrial policy means governments need to be 
attentive to how they intervene to stabilize and lower the exchange rate. If 
to prevent a large decline in the exchange rate they increase interest rates : 
(as was the wont of the IMF), while they may thereby save large numbers of 
enterprises who have taken on foreign-denominated debts, at the same time : 
they may kill other enterprises that were more prudent and took on only 
domestic debt. The effects may be particularly adverse to small and meclium-
sized enterprises (who typically do not take on foreign debt, because they do 
not have access to international markets) - as was evident in the East Asian 
crisis (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998). 
There are alternative ways of stabilizing the exchange rates, and, even 
more so, keeping exchange rates low, which may be less costiy - in particu- · 
Jar, direct intervention, with the consequent build-up of reserves. Some have 
suggested that it is impossible to push the exchange rate down for more 
than a short period of time. But such arguments are based on a confusion: it 
is impossible to keep exchange rates above the "market" level through direct 
intervention, because to do so requires selling dollars (or other hard cur-
rency), and countries only have limited amounts of these in their reserves. 
But to push the exchange rate down requires selling one's own currency, and 
buying dollars (or other hard currencies), and this countries can easily do. 
There are other instruments available for affecting especially the level of 
the exchange rate. Any regulation that affects the flow of money out of 01· 
into the country affects the exchange rate. Thus, making it easier for foreign 
companies to invest in the country leads to the appreciation of the cur-
rency; making it more difficult leads to the depreciation of the currency. In 
assessing foreign direct investment policy, one has to weigh the benefits of 
access to markets or technology or training with the costs to the rest of the 
economy from the exchange rate appreciation (including the adverse effects 
on learning). By the same token, loosening restrictions on citizens of the 
country investing their money abroad lowers the exchange rate. Since most 
countries have a broad array of reguiations affecting inward and outward 
investment, there is, in a sense, no "free market11 exchange rate. Through 
these regulations and through interest rates, as well as through direct inter· 
ventions, governments 11 set 11 the exchange rate, either intentionally or not. 
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A lower exchange rate represents a broad-based mechanism for industrial 
policy - firms themselves decide whether they can compete at that lower 
exchange rate. The government has identified broadly that the export sector 
has more learning externalities1 and therefore that sector should be encour-
aged relative to others; but it doesn't have to identify precisely which sub-
···. sectors or firms should be encouraged. The market does that. 
: This has both an advantage and a disadvantage. More finely-tuned target-
:.ing may increase the overall (dynamic) efficiency of the economy; after all, 
each firm or sector takes no account of the extent of the benefits that accrue 
!P others. A more targeted approach can offset the externali!y associated 
Ith.research or learning in each sector. On the other hand, government 
mpts at fine-tuning may encounter more severe "political economy 11 
t)blems. (See the discussion below.) 
There are two questions about the use of each of the instruments. First, 
t really matters is the real exchange rate. The question is: can govern-
! affect, at least more than just briefly, the real exchange rate? Here, the 
tical question is the extent and speed of "pass through." For very open 
onomies, importing and exporting a large fraction of their goods, lower-
the nominal exchange rate leads to increases in nominal prices1 which 
-undo the benefits, unless, say, monetary authorities take actions to 
en the potential inflation, but such actions themselves have costs (for 
pie, higher unemployment). It is clear that many countries have man-
ta lower their real exchange rate for an extended period of time, and 
e done so at the same time that they have promoted growth. 
condly, what are the costs of each of the interventions, and do the 
ef!ts exceed the costs? Some worry that the costs of preventing inflation 
, direct intervention are too high. The East Asian countries have man-
ta intervene in the exchange rate over long periods of time without 
g either high inflation, or high costs of avoiding inflation. But, at least 
ina, there is another growing concern: to keep the value of their cur-
y low, they have bought dollars, which yield a low return. Worse, dollars 
epreclating relative to the RMB, implying that they are experiencing a 
·) capital loss. 
strial policies can intervene in relative prices in ways that avoid 
osts (and which can in fact be more targeted than lowering the real 
ge rate), for example, by sectoral subsidies (including subsidized 
trates) or 11 infant industry11 protection. But international trade agree-
restrict the use of industrial policies. The only instrument left may be 
hange rate. Lowering the exchange rate simultaneously decreases the 
f exports in foreign currency, leading to an increase in the demand for 
1 and increases the price of imports (in domestic currency, relative to 
e of non-traded goods). It thus encourages substitution away from 
consumption goods. Increased exports and reduced imports lead 
de surplus. 
36 The Industrial Policy Revolution II 
In a two-period model, this means that the country consumes less t 
it could in the initial period, offset by increased consumption in the 1 
period." The static distortion (consuming less than what would norm 
maximize utility, based on the equality of the marginal rate of substi 
tion and the interest rate) is justified by the dynamic benefits - prod · 
more of the export good, say, leads to more learning, which genera 
higher level of consumption in the second period than would other 
be possible. 
But if the learning effects are strong enough, even in an infinite peri 
model, the benefits of expanding exports are sufficiently great that it m 
be possible that optimal policy requires the country to build up reserves f 
ever, never to use them (essentially like throwing money away). The ben 
of learning exceed the costs of the 11 forced saving" required to ensure 
the exchange rate remains competitive. One can construct a model in whi 
each period the world looks as it did the previous period, so that if it is des 
able to have a surplus at time t, it is desirable to have a trade surplus at ti 
t + 1. 24 (Of course, in a more general dynamic model, it may be desirable 
have trade surpluses initially, to be spent at later dates.) 
1.1.4 Investment policies 
In some (but not all) of the successful countries, foreign direct investm 
(FD!) has played an important role.25 For some countries with limited ac 
to finance, FD! can be an important source of funds. But even in those co 
tries with high savings rates, champions of FD! extol! its virtue in terms 
the transfer of knowledge. But this doesn't happen automatically, and 
learning splllovers are more important for some forms of FD! than other 
Thus, there are two questions facing industrial policies: How can FD!, es 
cially of the kind that might have more learning spillovers be promo 
And how can the amount of learning that results from any FD! that do 
occur be increased? 
The theory of localized technological change (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 196 
explains that the spi\lovers from learning associated with one technolo 
are more likely to b~ greater for "nearby" technologies. What matters 
both the relevance of the knowledge associated with one technology for 
improvement of another, and the capacity of those employing one techno 
ogy to learn from another. 
As Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014a) explain, spillovers may well be su·ong 
across sectors for similar technologies than within the sector for marked! 
different technologies. Thus, just-in-time inventory practices have benefit 
for many sectors in which inventories play an important role. 
Much of the knowledge that is embedded in, say, mining technologie 
is of limited relevance to most other sectors of the economy. Thus, th 
learning benefits of FD! associated with resource extraction are likely to 
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much more limited than those associated 'With1 say, manufacturing1 and 
this may help explain why so many resource-dependent economies remain 
"dualn economies, with few spillovers from the natural resource sector to 
the rest of the economy. If this is so, it means that FD! in this area - one 
that has dominated in Africa - is of much less benefit than FD! in other 
areas. 
While it may be easiest to learn about adjacent technologies, the benefits 
of such learning may be more limited than those associated with making 
larger steps (sometimes referred to as leapfrogging). There is then a compli-
. cated optimization problem: Both the costs and benefits increase the larger 
>the step. Moreover, one wants to move toward technologies from which one 
can learn the best going forward, and that may not always be easy to assess 
··from one's current vantage point. Korea and Japan's industrial development 
· .was characterized by strategies that did involve moving some distance from 
' the technologies that they were then employing. 
The discussion so far has focused on 11learning/1 but even more impor-
,:tant is "learning to learn" (Stiglitz, 1987c). Industrial and trade policy can 
enhance an economy1s learning capacities1 its underlying 11capabilities/1 
and development strategies need to be focused on that, especially in an era 
.With fast-changing technologies, where specific knowledge learned at one 
'moment risks rapid obsolescence. 
'').1.4.1 Government subsidies for FDI and other investment-related 
overnment subsidies for FD! have typically been justified in terms of the 
vernment revenue and employment generated. But our analysis suggests 
other rationale: learning. But if this is so, then subsidies should be larger 
r those sectors and technologies that are likely to have large spillovers, and 
r firms that are willing to engage in practices that enhance the likelihood 
such learning. 
In many cases, entrepreneurial spillovers may be larger in the case of 
mestic enterprises than foreign, since domestic firms are likely to be more 
y embedded within the local community. Government policy should, 
ordingiy, provide some preference for domestic fi11ns relative to foreign 
s, except when there are strong learning benefits that are specifically 
atfil to foreign firms, for example, because the foreign firm brings knowl-
ge that is not locally available. 
,Government policies can affect factor prices, and therefore the level of 
stment, and thus the level of learning. The benefits of learning can 
re than offset the social costs of the distortion. 
ompulsory employment/training programs and domestic procurement 
irements (programs that compel firms to source locally) are more likely 
ad to learning spillovers. The success of Malaysia's FD! was partially 
butable to such requirements. 
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1.1.5 Making the most of one's natural resources 
We noted earlier the large dependence of African economies on resource 
exports. ln the previous section we argued that linkages between natural 
resource production and other sectors were typically weaker than
1 
sari 
between manufacturing and the rest of the economy, helping to explain 
why there is typically such a latge gap between the state of technology in the 
mining and natural resource sector and other sectors of African economies, 
and explaining in part why the abundance of natural resources has often not 
been accompanied by the hoped-for increases in standards of living. 
The latter failure1 which has become known as the "resource curse 11 or the 
"paradox of plenty" (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, 2007; Karl, 1997), is 
partly explained by macroeconomic problems of high volatility and non-
competitive exchange rates that mark resource-rich countries. We have 
explained why volatility and high exchange rates are especially bad for the 
creation of a learning economy, and thus for long-run increases in standards 
of living. But there are well-known effective policy responses, including sta-
bilization and sovereign wealth funds and care in borrowing from abroad, 
especially in periods of commodity price booms. 
But industrial policies have not played as important a role in addressing 
the problems of the resource curse as they should have done. This is partly 
because the issues on which we have focused in this paper (and this volume 
more generally) have not received the attention that they should. 
Historically, African countries were thought of simply as a source of raw 
materials. in the development of the mines, little or no attention was given 
to how that development might affect the broader development of the econ-
omy (other than through the availability of resource rents). Transportation 
systems were designed to move the resources out of the country, not to 
promote the broader development of the country. · 
Trade policies in developed countries in the post-colonial era reinforced 
these colonial-era policies. Escalating tariffs, for instance, discouraged the 
development of value-added activities within the country. Neoclassical eco-
nomics provided a rationale for reinforcing policies: because most present· :: 
day African countries do not have a static comparative advantage in these 
value-added activities, they have been discouraged from developing them. 
The only circumstances in which such activities might make sense (from 
that perspective) are when transportation costs offset these disadvantages -
that is, it may make sense to do some processing if in doing so the costs of 
transportation are thereby reduced. 
But from a learning-development perspective, matters look markedly 
different. One of the reasons that African countries may not have done as 
well as others is that the "natural" (market-driven) learning spillovers fr01n 
mining and natural resource industries to the rest of the economy are less 
than those from 1 say, manufacturing. In _this view1 then1 the high exchange 
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rate and high volatility marking most natural resource-dependent countries 
has led to an economic structure that has discouraged activities with large 
learnh1g spillovers. Better macro-policies (leading to less volatility and lower 
exchange rates) can go some way to correcting this distortion. But so can 
industrial policies, by leveraging off the countries' resource base (in which 
at least some countries have a degree of monopoly power). 
This entails exploiting upstream, downstream, and horizontal linkages 
(Hirschman, 1958), and linkages that might be associated with processing 
~nd resource extracting itself. Some developing countries (like Malaysia) 
.)Jave actually succeeded in developing capabilities in resource extraction, by 
imposing employment and training conditions on foreign operators. 
: Even if much of resource extraction technology itself is not closely linked 
\vltb other technologies that might provide the basis of broader growth 
' d learning, many of the sub-activities entailed in the long and complex 
ocess of removing natural resources do. Buildings have to be built and 
ople have to be hired. Workers have to be fed. There is a demwd for peo-
e md vehicles for transportation and logistics. In short, for many African 
untries, the exploration and development of these linkages can be the 
is of an effective industrial policy, one which enhances the capabilities 
the people and firms within them. (For a more extensive discussion, see 
rdar1, 2014.) 
i1.6 Distribution, employment, and environmental concerns 
dard industrial policy focused on changing the sectoral composition of 
P to enhance growth - in our case, to enhance learning. But it should 
mphasized that the failure of markets to incorporate learning externali-
is only one market failure, one instance in which private rewards and 
'al returns are misaligned1 and any misalignment provides a rationale for 
ustrial policy. 
f particular relevance for many African countries are distribution, the 
onment, and employment. The market, by itself, seems to be creating 
few jobs, is associated with socially unacceptable levels of inequality, 
has adverse impacts on the environment. Industrial policy can and 
uld be directed at each of these; and in some cases, policies directed at 
·gating one problem may have benefits in addressing another. 
. ore generally, what matters is not GDP, but the quality of life, "well-
g" and the enhancement of individual and societal capabilities. What 
entails - and how performance can be better measured,26 and how 
er measured performwce can be increased through industrial policy -
Id and can be a subject of rational inquiry. 
r instance, environmental impacts are important for all countries, but 
dally for developing countries. The fact that natural resources and the 
onment are 11underpriced11 means that there are insufficient incentives 
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to allocate resources (inducting those devoted to learning) toward the en 
ronment and natural resources - so more get expended on saving labor, BT 
though labor is in surplus. 
This highlights a difference between developed and developing coun · 
and a reason why it is important that developing countries have their 
innovation policies. Much of innovation in advanced industrial economi 
has been directed toward saving labor. But in many developing countri 
labor is in surplus, and unemployment is the problem. Labor-saving innov 
lions exacerbate this key social problem. 
Even when labor-saving innovation does not result in unemployment, . 
will have adverse distributional consequences, lowering wages. With inequ 
ity already so high in many African countries, this should be of concern. 
But there are further reasons that we should be concerned about growi 
inequality. It can lead to increased political and social instability. There· 
moreover, a growing understanding, even within the IMF, that inequali 
may lead to lower economic growth, more economic instability, and 
weaker economy (Stiglitz, 2012b; Berg and Ostry, 2011). While there a 
many channels through which these adverse effects operate (for exam 
pie, inequality diminishes the aggregate demand for domestic non-tract 
goods), one may be of particular importance in developing countries, wh 
there is a need for heavy public investments in infrastructure, educatio 
and technology. 
In a society with very little inequality, the only role of the state is t 
provide collective goods and conect market failures. When there are larg 
inequalities, interests differ. Distributive battles inevitably rage, and t 
prevent redistribution, wealthy elites often try to circumscribe the power 
of government. But in circumscribing government, the ability to perfo 
positive roles is also circumscribed. As we have argued here and elsewher 
government needs to play an important role in any economy, correctin , 
pervasive market failures, but especially in the "creative economy." 
Thus, our critique of non-inclusive growth goes beyond pointing out that 
it is a waste of a country's most valuable resource - its human talent - to fail 
to ensure that everyone lives up to his or her abilities. Non-inclusive growt 
can also lead to democracies that do not support high-growth strategies 
There can be a vicious circle, with more inequality leading to a more circum 
sa·ibed government, leading in turn to more inequality and slower growth. 
The analysis of this section has several obvious but important implica· 
lions: (i) Developing countries cannot just "bonow" /adapt technology from 
the North. There is a need for a new "model" of innovation. (ii) In particu-
lar, innovation needs to be directed (through industrial policies) at saving 
resources, protecting the environment, and improving the distribution of 
income. (iii) These objectives may be intertwined - industrial policies that 
promote more inclusiveness may promote more learning; better environ-
mental policies may lead to a better distribution of income. 
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Ll.7 Political economy 
t~µe of the standard objections to industrial policies in the past has been 
,;JJ,.plitical: the potential for misuse. The question is raised, can there be 
fective industlial policies in countries with significant deficiencies in 
.vernance? The argument has been put that even if such policies contrib-
greatly to the success of East Asia, elsewhere they were less successful, 
. cause they were abused. Critics suggest that industrial policies were largely 
,blame for Latin America's lost decade. The implication is that, while the 
~l Government intervention might improve matters, in the "real world" 
jerventions do not necessarily do so. Given the widely acknowledged 
(lciencies in governance in many African countries, they should shy away 
m such policies. 
ijlere are several responses to these objections. One is methodological: 
political economy objections may be true - but the conclusion is based 
olitical analysis, not economic analysis. And the political analysis is 
more simplistic than economic analysis. The first question is not 
er in some cases such interventions have failed1 but whether in some 
; <UlCes they have succeeded, and the answer to that is unambiguously, 
.. She second question is whether there are policies and institutions that 
be adopted that are more likely to lead to success, that at least reduce 
likelihood or extent of abuse. 
oreover1 similar questions can be raised about every other aspect of 
.cy. Many governments have not used monetary and financial regulatory 
:cy well; in some cases1 the misuse can be traced to problems of govern-
. (some have argued that regulators and central banks in some advanced 
~!:rial countries were captured by special interests in the financial mar-
d tliis played an important role in the 2008 global economic crisis.)27 
eW would argue that as a result, governments should eschew the use of 
ry and fhrnncial regulatory policy.ZS 
j Historical interpretation 
pserved earlier that there is ample evidence that countries have suc-
lly used industrial policies. Indeed, there aie few successful economies 
ch the government has not successfully employed industrial policies, 
y understood. 
eover, it is widely acknowledged that at the time that many of the East 
~Quntries began their industrial policies, not only was their economic 
ment lower than some of the less developed countries today, but so 
.·their political development. 
Conclusion that industrial policies were a failure in Latin America is at 
WJ.lentious, at worst, simply wrong. Brazil, the most ardent adopte; of 
licies, had an impressive growth rate of almost 6 percent in the three 
s of a century before 1980. Industrial policies played an important 
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role in that country's success in this period. The lost decade was a result 
Latin American countries1 excessive indebtedness in the 1970s, the peri 
of the oil shock - understandable, perhaps, given the low, or even n 
live, real interest rates at which the petro-dollars were being recycled -
lowed by the unprecedented increase in interest rates, a result of the Unite 
States suddenly switching its monetary policy regime to monetarism. Tlf 
lost decade of the 1980s was, in short, a result of a macroeconomic shoe 
rather than a failure of microeconomic policies. The subsequent adopti 
of the Washington Consensus policies, which eschewed industrial polici 
prolonged the subsequent period of slow growth. The more recent revival 
growth in Brazil, for example, has much to do with the government o 
agaln undertaking activist policies (Bertola and Ocampo, 2012). 
In short, the historical experience shows that industrial policies can wo 
Even instances of failure need to be interpreted with caution. Good polici 
involve some risk - if every public or private investment succeeded, it woul 
be indicative of insufficient risk taking. There are undoubtedly instances wher 
industrial policy has falled because of abuses. But the relevant question is: 
the problems inherent in political processes? The histmical record sugges 
strongiy that fallure is not inevitable. The historical record does suggest cautio 
especially in countries with poor governance. And it suggests that countries d 
what they can to improve governance; there are institutional reforms in 
political process that would reduce the risk of failure. 
1.1.7.2 Implications of governance deficiencies for the design of 
industrial policies 
But reforms to political processes are slow. The implication of deficienci 
in governance is that one needs to tailor the design of the instruments 
industrial policy around the capabilities and governance of the public sector. 
This poses an important trade-off. Broad-based measures such as exchange 
rate interventions require only that the government ascertaln that the sec· 
tors that would be encouraged by such interventions have more societal 
learning benefits than the sectors that would be discouraged - and there is 
ample evidence that that is the case (evidenced by the success of export-led 
growth strategies). Firms and sectors within the economy self-select, and 
the expansion of firms and sectors with greater learning enhances the dyna· 
mism of the economy. On the other hand1 more targeted interventions can 
lead to even more learning and faster rates of growth. 
Of course1 no intervention completely 11solves 11 the political economy prob-
lem: Sectors that benefit from exchange rate intervention may lobby for the 
maintenance of that intervention even in the absence of learning benefits. 
Some countries have shown that they can manage the political economy· 
problems of more targeted interventions. The East Asian countries did so by 
using rulewbased systems in which interventions were linked to past export 
success. 
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The East Asian countries used the quest for 11 rents 11 in a positive way: 
competition for rents led to firms that learned more and became more com-
petitive in the global marketplace. In other countries, though, rent seeking 
. has diverted resources away from growth-Inducing innovation. Firms have 
devoted their resources to learning how to circumvent regulations designed 
to make the economy more stable and to learning how to exploit consum-
. ers and their monopoly power better. Markets don't work well when private 
,:;returns are not well aligned with social returns; and in those circumstances, 
.incentives to innovate and learn are also distorted. 
0
1.7.3 Liberalization and political economy 
Uy, we note that liberalization is itself a political agenda. As we previ-
ly commented, markets do not exist in a vacuum. There are always going 
be rules and regulations, even In a liberalized world. And the design of 
Se rules and regulations will shape markets. The rules and regulations 
twere adopted in the process of "liberalizing" and deregulating financial 
kets in the United States and the United Kingdom led to bloated flnan-
lnstitutions backed by implicit guarantees from the monetary authority 
ultimately the taxpayer - a perhaps unintentional industrial policy that 
rted the economy. 
;8 Concluding comments 
. central thesis of this paper is that pervasive market failures (and other 
ions that result In private rewards being misaligned with social 
) provide a rationale for industrial policies - government interven-
sectoral allocations. We focused on one particular set of market 
, those that arise in the process of learning: Learning is especially 
. t for developing countries as they strive to close the gap between 
.comes and those of the more developed countries. A central focus of 
!llent policy should be how to promote learning and how to create 
geconomy and society." We noted that much of the advice of the 
s.ed on neoclassical models, not only gave short shrift to these con-
1.lt may actually have led to counterproductive policy prescriptions 
:e:adverse to learning, and hence to long-term increases in standards 
·on creating a learning society has broad implications for financial 
1 market liberalization, the design of monetary policy and institu-
oeconomic policies, intellectual property regimes, investment 
ation, and expenditures on infrastructure, education, and tech-
al frameworks for corporate governance and bankruptcy - indeed 
re economic regime. All need to be viewed through a learning 
Some have direct effects on learning, some have longer-term 
learning capabilities or how they impact the acquisition of 
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learning capabilities, while some have indirect effects, for example, as th 
create more macro~instability; which has adverse effects on investments 
learning. Some have multiple effects.29 
For Africa, as it attempts to reindustrialize1 to restructure its economi 
to become more integrated into the global economy and move away fro 
excessive dependence on commodity exports, to raise standards of incom 
increase employment, reduce poverty and inequality, and to protect a fragi 
environment, industrial policies are especially important. We have explain 
why the widely cited objections - that though industrial policy may ha 
worked in East Asia, it is inappropriate for Africa because of deficiencies 
governance - are unpersuasive. Governance issues are, of course, relevant 
all countries, and are important in shaping the form that industrial poli 
takes and the instruments that are appropriately used. 
The belated recognition of the potential of these policies comes at a 
tunate time, for changes in the global economy may afford the courr 
of Africa a distinct opportunity to transform their economies in a way 
will, at long last, narrow the gap that separates standards of living in 
subcontinent from that of much of the rest of the world. 
Notes 
1. Paper presented to an International Economic Association roundtable confe 
ence on "New Thinking on Industrial Policy: Implications for Africa," Prete 
July 3-4, 2012, co"sponsored by the World Bank, UNID01 and the South Afric 
Economic Development Department. Research support from Laurence Wil 
Samson and the helpful comments of the other participants in the seminar 
gl'atefully acknowledged. This paper is a companion to B. Greenwald and J. 
Stiglitz1 11 lndustrial Policies, the Creation of a Learning Society, and Econom 
Development, 11 presented to the International Economic Association/World B 
Industrial Policy Roundtable in Washington, DC, May 22-3, 2012 (Greenwal 
and Stiglitz1 2014a). Both papers are based on Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006) an 
Stiglitz (2014b, 2012a). · 
2. McKinsey1 2010. 
3, See for exainple, McKinsey1 20101 Ibid. Exhibit 1 indicates that 24 percent of th, 
growth between 2000 and 2008 in sub-Saharan Africa is attributable to resoUl'c 
(but a further 8 percent is derived from resource-financed government expenditul'e) 
4. See Ernst & Young (2012). 
5. Proceedings available as Lin and Stiglitz (2013) in accompanying volume. 
6. lt is difficult to track inequality due to data limitations. The Africa Progress Repo 
(Africa Progress Panel 2012) states that 24 countries in Africa have Gini. coe 
cients in excess of 421 the level in China. lt also points out that in a number 
cases, recent growth has not been matched by falling poverty-which they attri 
ute to inequality (p.16) 1 "ln many countries, the pattern of economic growth 
reinforcing these inequalities. 11 • 
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7. See Delli Gatti et al. (2012a, 2012b). 
8. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014b), for a mOre extensive discussion of these mar-
ket failures. 
Moreover, potential competition is not an effective substitute for actual competi-
tion. See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988b); Stiglitz (1987b). 
10. 'These failures (imperfections in capital markets) can themselves be explained by 
Imperfections of information. 
ll. Broadly understood - not in the more restricted sense that the term was used by 
Williamson (1989). 
~l2. For a discussion of the impllcations of the crisis for economic theory and policy, 
see Stiglitz (2011). 
. It ls1 perhaps, worth noting that what is viewed as corruption in one society may 
not be so viewed in that way by others. Many point to the American system of 
large campaign contributions and revolving doors, which seems to "buy" favora-
ble legislation as a form of corruption, even if there isn1t money stuffed into 
brown paper envelopes for the politicians themselves. 
;::Dixit (2012) has argued that firms from developing countries may have a knowl-
edge advantage in dealing with governments of other developing countries. 
;>Herbert Simon emphasized that if there are differences in the performance of 
public and private enterprises, the differences could not be explained just by dif-
ferences in incentives, since in both typically most individuals work for others, 
/ i:JTidhave to be incentivized. See, for example, Simon (1991, 1995). 
{/This examination of authority and organizational identification should help 
'ex.plain how organizations can be highly productive even though the relation 
between their goals and the material rewards received by employees, if it exists 
at all, is extre1nely indirect and tenuous. In particular, it helps explain why 
careful comparative studies have generally found it hard to identify systematic 
differences in productivity and efficiency between profit-making, nonprofit, and 
publicly controlled organizations" (Simon 1995: 288). 
, See Greenwald and Kahn (2005). 
, i;eenwald and Stiglitz (2003) present the general theory. 
re are exceptions, including the increase in productivity in the current US 
· n. While there are several explanations of this distinctive aspect of the 
wnturn1 one is that the increasingly shortsighted behavior of firms ignores the 
g run costs of firing or laying off trained workers. In that case, it will still be 
case that there will be long-run adverse effects of the downturn on productiv-
In the Great Depression productivity growth also appears to have been quite 
h in part due to important investments made by government (including in 
nsportation) (Field, 2011). 
is, of course, consistent, with standard results on unit roots. See Dickey and 
r (1981) and Phillips and Perron (1986). 
can be put slightly differently: With capital (debt and equity rationing) the 
w price of capital often increases dramatically. (See Greenwald, Stiglitz
1 
and 
, 1984; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003). 
nwald, Salinger, and Stiglitz (1990); Stiglitz (1994). 
over, as we noted above, learning benefits fron1 having a stable environment. 
Stiglitz (2012a). 
;(}reenwald and Stiglitz, (2014b). 
did not play an important role in several of the countries of the East Asian 
de (Korea, Taiwan, and Japan). 
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26. See, in particular, Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2010). 
27. See, for example, Stiglitz (2010). 
28. Though some conservatives do argue, on this basis, that there should be a retur 
to the gold standard, and that there should be no role for discretionary moneta 
policy. However, since the failure of monetarism, these extreme positions 
garnered little support among economists. 
29. That is the case, for instance, for financial liberalization, which may lead t 
more macroeconomic volatility, and less access to finance by domestic small an 
medium sized firms, thus impeding the development of domestic entreprenew:· 
ship capabilities. See Rashid (2012, 2014) and Emran and Stiglitz (2009). 
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